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Abstract
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1 Introduction: what is the landscape problem?
The landscape problem[1] in string theory was born in 1986 when Andrew Strominger
discovered that there were vast numbers of consistent string vacua-many more than the
Calabi-Yao solutions which had been discovered the year before[2]. As Strominger wrote
in his paper describing that discovery,
The class of supersymmetric superstring compactifications has been enormously
enlarged. . . . It does not seem likely that [these] solutions . . . can be classified in the
foreseeable future. As the constraints on [these] solutions are relatively weak, it does
seem likely that a number of phenomenologically acceptable . . . ones can be found.
. . . While this is quite reassuring, in some sense life has been made too easy. All
predictive power seems to have been lost.
All of this points to the overwhelming need to find a dynamical principle for de-
termining [which theory describes nature], which now appears more imperative than
ever[2] .
However compelling this now seems, it took 17 years, till 2003, for the landscape prob-
lem to be widely appreciated[3, 4]. Why was the existence of the landscape so hard to
accept?
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Part of the answer is that many of us believed in the possibility of a principled expla-
nation for the laws of nature. We hoped to discover a short list of principles, which could
be realized in a unique theory, which would retrodict the standard model and uniquely
predict the physics to be discovered beyond it. It was reasonable to guess that these prin-
ciples would be the conjunction of those of quantum theory and general relativity, given
the difficulty of making any theory that combined them. The shocking implication of the
results Strominger reported in 1986 was that this was not to be, at least within the confines
of string theory. Given the implications, it is not surprising if it took until 2003 for many
researchers to give up the notion of a uniquely predictive string theory[3, 4].
String theory offered more, however, then just a vast or infinite list of possible low
energy effective theories. It offered the promise of a setting in which the different pertur-
bative string theories are realized as expansions around solutions of a still more funda-
mental theory. Within that theory there could be non-perturbative processes that would
result in dynamical transitions between the different perturbative string theories; hence
between different low energy phenomenologies. That more fundamental theory would
have to be background independent-by definition-because it would have to be defined
in a way that transcended perturbative expansions around particular semiclassical solu-
tions.
Unfortunately, so far that promise of a truly background independent formulation of
string theory has not been achieved1. The reasons this project-often called the search for
M theory-has so far frustrated would seem to be the subject or another review. But the
landscape problem and the problem of background independence are closely linked. The
former is the only route the latter has to experimental confirmation. It is also the case
that the background independent theory provides the setting for dynamical processes by
which the universe can evolve through sequences of effective theories.
Hence, the options for resolving the landscape problem are going to influencewhat we
expect from the solution to the background independence problem. Below I will suggest
that this influence takes us to surprising places, altering fundamentally our strategy and
expectations to construct the background independent theory. To get there we begin by
reviewing the landscape problem. Our aim will be to put it in a broader setting which
will give us a perspective from which to discuss the status of attempts to resolve both the
landscape problem and the problem of finding a background independent formulation of
string orM theory.
The hypothesis underlying all approaches to the landscape is that there is a cosmo-
logical setting in which different regions or epochs of the universe can have different
effective laws. This implies the existence of spacetime regions not directly observable,
because there is good evidence against the variation of the parameters of the standard
model on scales of billions of years. These regions must either be in the past of our big
bang, or far enough away from us to be causally unrelated. These different possibilities
1For several reasons this cannot be the AdS/CFT correspondence. One reason is that the cosmological
constant has the wrong sign, another is that a cosmological theory cannot have boundaries or asymptotic
regions, for reasons I will discuss below.
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give rise to three classes of cosmological settings in which to situate hypotheses for the
dynamical evolution of effective laws.
1. Causally distinct regions, which may be called pluralistic multiverse cosmologies.
The main example of these is eternal inflation[5, 6].
2. A succession of past epochs, which are cyclic cosmological models. Recent examples
are the ekpyrotic models of Steinhardt, Turok and colleagues[7] and the conformal
cyclic cosmology of Penrose[8].
3. Combinations of the two, in which there are epochs in the past which branch on re-
production. Examples of these are phoenix cyclic cosmologies[11] and cosmological
natural selection[12, 13, 14, 15, 1].
Attempts to solve the landscape problem have so far been situated mainly within two
of these settings, which are eternal inflation and cosmological natural selection. One of
the aims of this essay is to give an evaluation of how well each attempt is doing. Another
is to provide a deeper perspective that might guide the search for new solutions to the
landscape problem2.
But, before we discuss details it is worth stating carefully what exactly would consti-
tute a solution to the landscape problem.
• An acceptable solution to the landscape problem would be an explanation for the
choice of effective laws and their parameters observed in our universe which is
scientific in the sense that
1. That explanation has several further necessary consequences at least some of
which are falsifiable[17] by presently doable observations of experiments.
2. It will have other consequences which are strongly confirmable by presently
doable observations or experiments. By strongly confirmable I mean that the
consequences are sufficiently unique to this explanation that if seen it would
constitute strong evidence for the correctness of the explanation.
3. Some of the falsifiable consequences have failed attempts at falsification and
some of the strongly confirmable consequences have been confirmed.
• The solution should explain the improbable features of the standard model which
include the large hierarchies in scales and dimensionless parameters and the fact
that they seem to be fine tuned to create a universe that has highly improbable
complex structures over a wide range of scales from clusters of galaxies down to
molecular biology.
2This partly reflects conclusions reached in joint work with Roberto Mangabeira Unger[44].
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• The solution should explain the very special initial conditions of the universe as
well. Given that a solution to the landscape problem requires a speculative cosmo-
logical scenario, if confirmed there will not be an opportunity to go back and adjust
it to explain also the choice of cosmological initial conditions.
Note that if a proposal to resolve the landscape problem does not satisfy conditions
one and two, it cannot be considered to be even a candidate for a solution to the landscape
problem.
The landscape problem represents a serious crisis in the development of science. Its
solution requires, as we shall see, the construction of speculative cosmological scenarios,
which posit regions or epochs of our universe for which we presently have no observable
evidence. Nonetheless we must insist on taking seriously only scenarios and hypotheses
that make falsifiable or strongly verifiable predictions, otherwise people can just make
stuff up and the distinction between science and mythology becomes porous. To do so is
very challenging. This is hard, serious science, and it cannot be rushed.
As challenging as this situation is, there are two reasons for optimism. One is that there
already are candidate solutions that make real, falsifiable predictions. Some of these pre-
dictions involve features of the CMB that code information about a cosmological epoch to
the past of our big bang. This possibility of making observations which test hypotheses
about past epochs is the second reason for optimism-and I will discuss examples below.
So there is no need to despair. Meanwhile, special pleading that the standards of sci-
ence should be lessoned to admit explanations with no falsifiable consequences, in order
to keep alive a bold speculative idea, should be strongly resisted. While speculation has
its place in science, ultimately science is not interested in what might be true, it is inter-
ested only in what can be convincingly demonstrated by deductions from observational
evidence.
I should stress that the landscape problem, while it arose in string theory, is likely to
be there whatever the fundamental unification of physics turns out to be. There is no
evidence from any approach to quantum gravity that mathematical consistency or the
existence of a low energy limit restricts the matter content of a theory. In loop quantum
gravity and spin foam models it appears that the theory is consistent with coupling to a
large set of gauge groups, fermions and scalar fields.
But the strongest reason to expect the landscape problem is not an anomaly of string
theory is that it has deep historical roots, which I sketch in the next section. It might
have been anticipated a long time ago-and indeed it was. These historical roots of the
landscape problem suggest that the landscape problem was bound to occur as physics
progressed. As I will argue, it is an inevitable consequence of the general form we have
assumed for physical theories since Newtonian mechanics. Thus, whether string theory
is correct or not as an hypothesis about unification of the fundamental forces, the land-
scape problem is likely to be a feature of whatever correct theory replaces it. Therefor the
future of theoretical cosmology will to a large extent hinge on finding the correct scientific
resolution of the landscape problem.
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After the historical sketch I explain in chapter 3 the three main options for cosmolog-
ical settings within which a solution to the landscape problem might be situated. These
options are evaluated in section 4.
2 Historical roots of the landscape problem
As our knowledge of the elementary particles and fundamental interactions grew dra-
matically during the 20th Century we began to be interested in questions that are not
answered by knowing the laws of physics. One of these is the question: why are these
the laws, rather than other possible laws? If there are many possible laws, each as logically
consistent as those we observe, what selected the set that are realized in our universe?
Another question not answered by knowing the laws is what selected the initial condi-
tions, at or near the big bang. These questions bothered a few physicists and philosophers
long before Strominger uncovered the landscape problem within string theory.
Within living memory, the idea of the evolution of laws was energetically championed
by John ArchibaldWheeler, who was, uniquely, a pioneer of both nuclear physics and the
quantum theory of gravity. In the 1960’s Wheeler contemplated the bouncing of black
hole3 singularities to new universes. By a bounce he meant that quantum effects would
eliminate the singularities of classical general relativity and lead regions of spactime tend-
ing to future singularities to expand again, thus forming new regions of spacetime to the
future of where those singularities would have been4. He further hypothesized that the
laws of physics-or at least their parameters- were “reprocessed” on each such instance[18]
A generation earlier, Dirac had proposed that laws of physics may evolve,
At the beginning of time the laws of Nature were probably very different from what
they are now. Thus, we should consider the laws of Nature as continually changing
with the eoch, instead of as holding uniformly throught space-time[22].
Why were these great scientists drawn to speculate that laws evolve? The reason
is that absent a principled explanation for the laws we find, the evolution of laws is a
necessary part of any explanation of the why these laws problem. There are in science
only twoways to explainwhy some state of affairs has come about. Either there are logical
reasons it has to be that way, or there are historical causes, which acted over time to bring
things to the present state. When logical implication is insufficient, the explanation must
be found in causal processes acting over time. This was understood clearly more than
a century ago by Charles Sanders Pierce, the founder of the school of philosophy called
American pragmatism,
3which he named.
4The evidence that quantum gravity effects eliminate singularities in this way has becomemuch stronger
recently. Compare older papers on bounces which employ mainly semiclassical methods[19] to the newer
literature on loop quantum cosmology which shows that bounces are generic in exact quantum evolutions
of a class of quantum cosmological models[20]. A study of modifications of coupling constants during
bounces is in [21].
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To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and
yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational,
is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to
be accounted for. Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason. Now the only
possible way of accounting for the laws of nature, and for uniformity in general, is to
suppose them results of evolution[23].
Pierce is insisting that it is not enough to know the laws of nature. He is demanding
that there be explicable reasons for the laws of nature themselves. This demand has a
long precedence in the history of science. It was most clearly articulated by Leibniz who
enunciated his[24]
• Principle of Sufficient Reason. For every property of nature which might be otherwise,
there must be a rational reason which is sufficient to explain that choice.
Leibniz makes it clear the kind of sufficient reason he has in mind must be something
beyond mathematical consistency.
The great foundation of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or of identity,
that is to say, that a statement cannot be both true and false at the same time and that
A is A, and cannot be not A. And this single principle is enough to prove the whole of
arithmetic and the whole of geometry, that is to say all mathematical principles. But in
order to proceed from mathematics to physics another principle is necessary. As I have
observed in my Theodicity, that is, the principle of a sufficient reason, that nothing
happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise[25].
If no reason can be given the choice must be a false choice. For example, no ratio-
nal reason can be given for why is the universe where it is and not ten feet to the left.
From this Leibniz draws the conclusion that space must be relational, so that only rela-
tive positions within the universe are physically meaningful. Physicists use the principle
of sufficient reason in this negative way when we show that two gauge equivalent con-
figurations of the electromagnetic or gravitational field refer to the same physical state.
Otherwise, one would not have unique deterministic evolution of fields. This was the
essence of Einstein’s ”hole” argument that led him to conclude that diffeomorphism in-
variance is a gauge symmetry and it was also the basis of Dirac’s influential work on
gauge invariance in constrained Hamiltonian systems.
What can count as sufficient reason for laws of nature? The landscape issue is precisely
the fact that mathematical consistency alone cannot account for the choice of the laws we
observe governing phenomena in our universe.
Pierce is saying that if we demand sufficient reason for the choice of the laws of nature
we can only answer successfully by positing that the present laws are the result of evolu-
tion from a past when the laws were different. To put Pierce’s argument in one line, Laws
must evolve to be explained.
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2.1 Sufficient reason for cosmological initial conditions
We can also apply Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason to the problem of the selection of
the initial conditions of the universe. It is a fact that in general relativity-and presumably
in any field theory of gravitation-there are an infinite number of solutions of the field
equations which have an initial singularity. To apply general relativity to cosmology, it is
then necessary to give the initial conditions at-or shortly after-the singularity. The choice
of initial conditions requires explanation. If we are optimistic and believe all questions
about the universe are answerable, then that explanation must satisfy the principle of
sufficient reason.
If no sufficient reason can be given within a given theory, then that theory must be
wrong. It is one thing for general relativity to have an infinite number of solutions in the
asymptotically flat case, for these correspond to idealized, approximate descriptions of
subsystems of the universe. These come in many copies, so the theory must have many
different solutions. But why should a cosmological theory have an infinite number of
solutions when there is only a single universe? Why does general relativity so extrav-
agantly overperform its job, giving not just predictions for the actual universe but also
predictions for an infinite number of universes that never exist? The only conclusion to
draw is that general relativity is not the correct cosmological theory. It is-at the very least-
to be supplemented, either by a theory of initial conditions or by an historical explanation
which explains why such special initial conditions were picked out for realization in the
one real world.
2.2 The common roots of the landscape problem and background in-
dependence
I bring up Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason because I believe it helps greatly to clar-
ify the issues that we confront in seeking a solution to the landscape problem. In partic-
ular, the principle of sufficient reason not only tells us that laws must evolve to be explained
and that there must be a dynamical explanation for the initial conditions of the universe.
It greatly constrains the context in which we seek those dynamical explanations which
led to the selection of the laws and initial conditions of our universe. This is because the
principle of sufficient reason singles out a class of theories of space and time-those that
are relational and background independent.
Thus, the landscape problem and the problem of making a background independent
quantum theory of gravity and cosmology are profoundly linked. Conceptually and his-
torically, both have their roots in the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
This is seen in several corollaries of the principle of sufficient reason that are highly
relevant for the contemporary search for an explanation for the selection of the observed
laws of physics.
• Space and time are relational rather than absolute. Leibniz used the principle of
sufficient reason heavily in his debates against Newton’s concept of absolute space
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and time. These arguments were elaborated by Mach and became the motivation
for Einstein’s invention of general relativity.
• The principle of the identity of the indiscernible. This holds that there cannot
be two entities in the world with exactly the same properties. If all properties are
relational then to identify a particular elementary particle is the same as giving a list
of all its properties, including its relative position in space and time.
• Causal or explanatory closure. This is the demand that all chains of causes and
chains of explanations for events in the universe close within the universe.
• A cosmological theory must be spatially compact, without boundaries. This is
a consequence of the previous principle, because if one has to impose asymptotic
boundary conditions to get a solution to a field equation then chains of causation
point outside the universe. The only way to avoid having to input boundary condi-
tions to determine a solution to general relativity or any other field theory is to not
have any spatial or null boundaries. This was the reason Einstein introduced spa-
tial compact solutions for general relativity and insisted on their use in modeling
cosmology.
• No unreciprocated actions. There should be no entity which acts on dynamical
degrees of freedom, which is not itself a dynamical degree of freedom which is
acted back on in return. This principle was used by Einstein to motivate his rejection
of absolute space in favour of a theory-general relativity-in which the geometry of
spacetime is a dynamical degree of freedom. Another way to say this is that there
must be no absolute or ideal entities, whose properties influence the evolution of
degrees of freedom, which are themselves not dynamically determined.
• Background independence. As a consequence of the last principle, we must rule
out proposals for a quantum theory of gravity which are dependent for their formu-
lation on fixed, non-dynamical, classical geometries. This rules out as fundamental
perturbative formulations of quantum gravity and string theory. These must be ap-
proximations to background independent formulations in which geometry is fully
dynamical and fully quantum.
The demand for an explanation for the choices of laws and initial conditions is deeply
related to the requirement that theories of gravitation and spacetime be background inde-
pendent. Both demands reflect the need to explain the universe only in terms of dynami-
cal processes internal to it. Both reflect the need that a scientific explanation for the laws
and initial conditions of our universe not rest on conjectures that are beyond experimen-
tal check. There must be no fixed background geometry for space and time, for the same
reason there can be no fixed, timeless laws. Either would leave us with a description of
the universe failing the test of sufficient reason.
This connection is one link between the landscape problem and the problem ofmaking
a background independent formulation of string orM theory.
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2.3 What kinds of explanation count as sufficient reason in science?
What kind of explanations can count as sufficient reason for a law or theory? As I argued
before, two general kinds of explanations that could be advanced to account for a state of
affairs. Reasons can be logical or they can be historical. They both may serve, but they
have very different consequences for the methodology of science. This is because logical
explanations can be complete while our knowledge of the past is always incomplete. This
raises the question of whether we can ever give the complete sufficient reason for a feature
of the present world whose explanation has an historical component.
Even if our knowledge of past conditions is detailed enough to justify giving a suf-
ficient reason for a present fact in terms of conditions at some past time, there remains
the problem that a complete explanation would involve us explaining those past condi-
tions. So causal explanation can often involve us in a regress in which we just push the
mysteries deeper into the past.
It might be thus be objected that sufficient reason is too strong of a criteria to apply to
explanations in science. It rarely happens that we know enough about nature to give the
complete reason something has a given property rather than an alternative. Explanation
in science is almost always tentative, for two distinct reasons. Scientific explanations are
always subject to revision when knowledge advances. These revisions can involve the
replacement of theories by newer theories which explain the same evidence in different
terms. As technology and science advance we also learn more about the past.
How are we to reconcile the demand for sufficient reason with the tentative character
of explanation in physics?
We do so by acknowledging that our attempts to give sufficient reason for present
features of the universe, including the laws, may in many cases be incomplete. But we
can still be faithful to the demand for sufficient reason by accepting explanations that
leave room for further developments that may improve our understanding of the past.
There is no shame in explaining the plentitude of galaxies in the universe in terms of
postulated initial conditions shortly after the initial singularity, so long as we leave open
the task of explaining those initial conditions. This is the case if we postulate that the
initial singularity postdicted by classical general relativity was in reality a bounce from an
earlier epoch. By doing so we invite the possibility of explaining those initial conditions
as being the result of evolution through the bounce.
It is, on the other hand, against the spirit of the demand for sufficient reason to adopt
explanations for present conditions that close off further inquiry. We do this if we adopt
an apriori principle which posits that the inferred initial conditions are the result of a
unique initial state of the universe. The problem with this may be that the principle is
not subject to falsification or further verification because it is alleged to only act once-
at the beginning of the universe. An apriori principle which is designed to postdic the
initial conditions inferred from experiment without making any additional predictions
can not be falsified. The adoption of this kind of explanation stops further inquiry and so
is against the spirit of the demand for sufficient reason.
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This concern is addressed by the principles of causal closure and no unreciprocated
actions. If all chains of explanation remain within the universe and involve only dynam-
ical degrees of freedom that have reciprocal interactions with everything they influence,
then our explanations of the present will go only so far as our knowledge of the past.
We can call this the practice of modesty about past causes: do not assert an untestable
hypothesis that closes off further investigation where a confession of ignorance leaves the
situation open to genuine explanation when our knowledge of the past improves.
To summarize, in some circumstances, the demand for sufficient reason must result
in a confession of ignorance, when causal chains are pushed back into the past to the
point where our present knowledge of the past ends. This is better then proclaiming first
movers or initial states which are not subject to further explanation in terms of their pasts,
and so cannot be further improved as our observations of the past improve.
We can illustrate this principle of modesty with one of the main choices that face con-
temporary cosmologists, which is whether to accept the initial cosmological singularity
as a first moment of time or hypothesize that in the correct physics the singularity will be
replaced by a bounce that opens up a much older past to scientific investigation. By en-
dowing the very early universe with a past, the hypothesis of a bounce makes the unusual
conditions of the early universe explicable in terms of its prior history.
If one instead hypothesizes that the initial singularity the beginning of time one is face
to face with the necessary of basing science on an inexplicable choice, which is the initial
conditions of the universe.
2.4 The full scope of the landscape problem
To emphasize the full import and scope of the landscape problem, we have to dig a bit
deeper. As I will now argue, its roots lie in assumptions physicists have made since the
time of Newton about the structure of physical theories. Newtonian mechanics, field
theory, general relativity and quantum theory have a common framework which is orga-
nized as follows.
1. We specify a system to be studied. This is almost always an approximate or effec-
tive description of a small subsystem of the universe. We do this by specifying the
degrees of freedom we are interested in studying.
2. We specify a timeless space of states, C, which is a phase space or Hilbert space. This
gives us possible initial states in which our system can be prepared.
3. We specify a dynamical law acting on C. This allows us to evolve states in C, so that
given the choice of initial state, prepared at an initial time, we can compute the state
at any future time.
We call this framework of theories, the Newtonian paradigm.
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Because this framework has been so successful when applied to the small subsystems
of the universe, it appears almost obvious that when we come to the task of developing a
cosmological theory, we should just scale it up to include the whole universe in the state
space, C. However, as successful as it has been, this schema for physical theories cannot
be applied to the universe as a whole. There are several distinct reasons for this.
• The Newtonian paradigm takes the dynamical law as input. It cannot be the basis
of explaining why that law is the one that applies to our universe. Hence to adopt
this paradigm as the framework of a cosmological theory will leave a great deal of
mystery in our understanding of the world. We will fail to fulfill the demand to give
sufficient reason for every cosmological question.
• Similarly, the Newtonian paradigm takes the specification of the initial state as in-
put. It cannot justify or explain the choice of initial state. The demand for sufficient
reason will again not be answered.
• The Newtonian paradigm assumes that there is an absolute distinction between the
role of state and the role of the dynamical law. This distinction can be operationally
realized on small subsystems because we can prepare a system many times in dif-
ferent initial states and observe what aspects of the resulting evolution are universal
and what are consequences of the choice of initial state. The dynamical law is in-
ferred from observations of universal features of the motion which are independent
of the choice of initial state. When we come to the universe there is only a single
history and so we have no way to operationally or experimentally distinguish the
role of the law from the choice of initial state.
This can be a practical as well as a theoretical issue because there can be degenera-
cies in cosmological models arising from the fact that a single observation can be
explained equally well by modifying the law of motion or the choice of initial con-
ditions. One sees examples of this in attempts to fit inflationary models to data such
as the possible non-guassianities[26].
• Any theory formulated in the Newtonian paradigm will have an infinite number of
solutions. But, the universe is unique-so only one cosmological history is physically
real. The Newtonian paradigm is then very extravagant when applied to cosmology
because it not only makes predictions about the future of the one real universe, it
offers predictions for an infinite number of universes which are never realized. The
Newtonian paradigm cannot explain why the one solution that is realized is picked
out from the infinite number of possibilities.
Because of these issues, it is best to think of attempts to construct an exact cosmological
theory by scaling up the Newtonian paradigm as fallacious-because they take a method
that is very well suited to describing subsystems of the universe and apply it beyond its
realm of validity. This can be called the cosmological fallacy.
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Note that this does not apply to commonly studied cosmological models such as the
standard cosmological model as these are explicitly based on truncations to a subset of the
degrees of freedom, namely the homogeneous degrees of freedom and small fluctuations
around them in a limited region.
One way to express the cosmological fallacy is through the following cosmological
dilemma. The Newtonian paradigm expresses the forms of all the laws we know which
have been thought of as exact. Nonetheless, every law formulated and verified within
the Newtonian paradigm can only apply to a bounded domain and hence is approxi-
mate.
Here is the argument for this perhaps counterintuitive assertion. To operationally real-
ize the distinction between laws and initial conditions one needs many instances to apply
the law to. Only that way can one show that the law holds when the initial conditions are
varied. But since there are many instances, each one is only a part of the history of the
universe. Hence each instance is a description of a subsystem of the universe. However,
there are no true isolated systems in nature. Each treatment of an isolated system is an
approximate truncation of an open system. Hence each such theory is approximate.
Only a truly cosmological theory could be an exact theory. But our different arguments
tell us that we can only hope for sufficient reason within a cosmological theory that does
not fall into the Newtonian paradigm.
If one ignores the cosmological dilemma and proceeds to try to construct a theory of
the whole universe within the Newtonian paradigm one is committing the cosmological
fallacy.
The landscape issue is then an aspect of the failure of the Newtonian paradigm to
serve as a basis for a truly cosmological theory. If we are to solve the landscape problem
and not fall into an infinite regress, we must do so in a new framework which cannot be
characterized as within the Newtonian paradigm. The task is then to invent a new theory
which can be applied to the universe as a whole, which will not leave us asking, why this
theory and why these initial conditions?
How can we do this? By seeking theories which transcend the three absolute features
of the Newtonian paradigm: that the space of states is timeless, that the choice of laws is
timeless and that there is an absolute distinction between laws and states.
These comments apply to any theory expected to hold at a cosmological scale: hence
they apply to the background independent framework from which, it is hoped, the differ-
ent perturbative string theories will emerge. Hence we learn something important about
the search forM theory: it must not be describable within the Newtonian paradigm. If it
is to be the real theory of everything it must be formulated in such a way that we cannot
further enquire as to why this law and why these initial conditions. It must somehow
furnish its own sufficient reason.
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3 Options for a solution to the landscape problem
Yet another way to state the landscape problem is to assert that our observable universe
does not contain enough information to answer the two big why questions: Why these
laws and not others? and Why those initial conditions? But if we insist on the principle
of explanatory closure than the universe must contain enough information to answer any
query that can be made about its properties-including these two questions. The answer
must lie in regions of the universe that we have not so far observed directly. For it is likely
that the universe is bigger and older than the region we can observe.
In our analysis of the why these laws question we concluded that laws must have
evolved dynamically to be explained. This implies that there were dynamical processes in
our past by which the laws evolved. As we do not see any evidence that the fundamental
laws or their parameters evolved in the observable past, these processes must have gone
on in regions yet unresolved observationally. This accords with the intuitive picture that
the effective laws may have evolved in events that involved energies or energy densities
much in excess of those in our observable universe.
We now face several choices:
1. Was there a bounce or singularity to our past?
2. Did the evolution of laws happen all at once, or incrementally over many stages?
That is, do we live in a first generation universe or does our universe have a long
chain of ancestry?
3. Was the chain of ancestry linear, so that each universe gives rise to a single progeny,
or does it branch, with each universe giving rise to many progeny.
Let us investigate the different options. These give rise to three classes of global cos-
mological scenarios.
3.1 Three options for global structure of the larger universe
If we posit that the initial singularity was really the first moment of time, then there is a
brief time available for the evolution of the laws to have taken place. In this case there is
unlikely to have been time for incremental evolution through many epochs. Our universe
then probably arose from some primordial state in one or a few steps.
One early suggestion for such a cosmological setting for variation of the laws was
Villenkin and Linde’s eternal inflation scenario[5, 6], within which an infinite number of
universes are born as bubbles in phase transitions from a primordial eternally inflating
medium. In the simplest version of this framework our observable universe is one of an
infinite number of universes each produced in a single step from a primordial state of
eternal inflation. (It is also possible that there are bubbles within bubbles but these chains
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of descent are not taken as central to the explanatory power of the scenario as they are in
cosmological natural selection5.)
The resulting multiverse scenario posits that the infinite numbers of universes are
mostly causally disjoint from each other. A bubble universe may have collided with
other bubbles, but almost certainly any pair of bubbles in the population of universes
are causally disjoint6. We can call this a pluralistic cosmological scenario.
Although eternal inflation was proposed before the realization of the string landscape,
it has become the setting in which much research on dynamical evolution of laws on the
landscape has been carried out[3, 4].
On the other hand, by positing that the singularity was replaced by a bounce we en-
dow our universe with a deep past during which there may have been many epochs of
classical universes. These would have allowed the effective laws to evolve incrementally
over many generations, all in our causal past. These may be called cosmological scenarios
with succession.
There are again two choices, depending on what bounced. The big bang may have
followed a complete collapse of a prior universe. So we arrive to the scenario of a cyclic
universe.
The big crunch of a cyclic universe may have given rise to a single progeny-or it may
have given rise to many. The latter may be the case if there is a selection effect whereby
regions of the crunch must be sufficiently homogeneous to bounce. Hence we have to
distinguish between linear cyclic cosmologies, in which a universe has a single progeny,
and branching cyclic cosmologies, in which there will be many.
The other possibility was that the big bang was the result of the bounce of a black hole
singularity. If black hole singularities bounce then a universe may have many progeny,
each the result of a collapse to a black hole. Indeed, our universe can be estimated to have
at least 1018 black holes and hence at least as many progeny. Hence scenarios in which
black hole singularities bounce are branching cosmological scenarios.
The scenario of bouncing black hole singularities is the setting for the framework of
cosmological natural selection[12, 13, 14, 15, 1], which will be discussed below.
The only kinds of singularities which are generic in solutions to the Einstein equations
are cosmological and black hole singularities. So these are the only options for cosmolog-
ical scenarios in which singularities are replaced by bounces.
So we have the following options for a global cosmological model7:
• Pluralistic scenarios such as eternal inflation in which there is a population of uni-
verses, all derived from a primordial state by a one stage process, largely if not
completely causally distinct from each other.
5There can even be tunneling back to the initial false vacuum leading to a recylcing of the universe as
described in [27].
6An observer in a bubble will see a finite number of bubbles colliding with theirs in the past. Eventually,
given infinite time, a bubble may collide with an infinite number of other bubbles but this will still be an
infinitesimal fraction of the infinite colllection of bubbles[28]
7There are also hybrids of these scenarios such as [16]
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• Linear cyclic scenarios in which there is a succession of universes, eachwith a single
parent and a single ancestor.
• Branching scenarios in which each universe has a single parent but many progeny.
We now investigate the options for explaining the selection of laws in our universe in
each of these three kinds of scenario.
4 Prospects for a solution of the landscape problem in the
three scenarios
Before we analyze the possible solutions to the landscape problem offered by the three
kinds of scenarios we should be mindful of a few key issues.
• In any landscape scenario-whether in biology or physics- there are two landscapes:
the landscape of fundamental parameters and the landscape of parameters of effec-
tive low energy theories. There can be a rather complicated relationship between
them. In biology these are the spaces of genotypes-the actual DNA sequences and
the space of phenotypes-the space of actual features of creatures that natural se-
lection acts on. In physics these may be the landscape of string theories and the
landscape of parameters of the standard model. In biology, as well as in physics,
the explanatory power of a scenario depend partly on how well understood are the
relationships between the two kinds of landscapes.
• The bounces are very high energy processes but there is evidence for a lot of fine
tuning at the level of the low energy parameters. How can the bounces then play a
role in selecting for fine tuning of the low energy parameters?
• We can observe only what is in our past light cone. If a cosmological scenario posits
an ensemble of universes outside of causal contact with our own then we risk a
situation where the characterization of the other members of the ensemble is free
from check by observation. There is a great danger then of just making stuff up to get
answers we want. The only way to constrain an ensemble of causally disconnected
universes by observation is if there is a dynamical principle that makes it possible to
deduce that every or almost every universe in the ensemble shares some property
P . Then an observation that P is not seen would falsify the theory.
Mindful of these cautions, we can now examine what opportunities our three kinds of
cosmological scenarios offer for a solution of the landscape problem.
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4.1 Linear cyclic models
The linear cyclic models have a great advantage over the other two scenarios in that all the
epochs or universes it posits are in the causal past of ours. There is then abundant oppor-
tunities for making predictions that are subject to observational check. So far two kinds
of cyclic models have been studied, and both offer falsifiable predictions. The ekpyrotic
models of Steinhardt, Turok and collaborators predict that there will be no observable
tensor modes in the CMB. The conformal cyclic cosmology of Penrose predicts the ex-
istence of concentric circles in the CMB due to gravitational waves formed by colliding
black holes in the previous era8.
What prospects then do the linear cyclic models have to explaining the selection of
laws? One can easily hypothesize that at each bounce there are changes in the effec-
tive laws, perhaps brought about by phase transitions amongst vacua of string theory or
whatever the fundamental theory is. This will give us a series of points in the landscape,
representing the effective laws in each epoch. However, to explain the choice of laws there
must be an attractor in the landscape. Otherwise the progression of laws through the epochs
will just be random, and nothing about the present choice of laws will be explicable.
For the evolution on the landscape to converge to an attractor, the changes in each
generation must be small. Also, to explain the choice of parameters of the low energy
theory by a series of transitions in the fundamental theory, it must be that small changes in
the fundamental landscape give rise to small changes in the landscape of the low energy
effective theory.
Furthermore, that attractor must somehow be determined by properties of low energy
physics, otherwise the fine tunings of the standard model will not be explicable.
4.2 Branching models
Branching models give share one good property with linear cyclic models, which is that
there are long chains of descent. This can make possible incremental accumulation of
good properties through slow, stable, evolution to attractors. However they deviate from
linear cyclic models in giving rise to a growing population of causally disconnected uni-
verses. These can lead to predictions about our universe only to the extent that it can
be predicted that there will be properties, P shared by all or almost all members of the
ensemble.
This is illustrated by the two examples we have of branching models.
4.2.1 Branching cyclic cosmologies
In the branching cyclic cosmologies it can be hypothesized that only regions of the col-
lapsing universe that are sufficiently spatially homogeneous will bounce to make new
expanding universes[11]. Because the region must be very homogenous to bounce, each
8Claims by Penrose and Gurzadyan[9] that these have been observed are presently controversial[10].
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new universe will be very homogeneous. Homogeneity is then a property P that is shared
by all members of the ensemble-hence it is predicted for our universe. One can hope that
more detailed modeling of the bounces may lead to new predictions for our universe of
this kind which may be falsifiable.
We can note that a great advantage of cyclic cosmologies in general is that they elimi-
nate the need for inflation to explain the specialness of the cosmological initial conditions.
Can the branching cyclic cosmologies explain the selection of the low energy physics?
In this regard the answer is the same as with regard to the linear branching cosmologies:
the changes in both the fundamental and effective laws must be small from generation to
generation and there must be an attractor in the landscape of the low energy theory for
the evolution to converge to.
4.2.2 Cosmological natural selection
Cosmological natural selection[12, 13, 14, 15, 1] was invented to give an answer to the
landscape problem that explained the reasons for the fine tunings of the standard model
without making use of the anthropic principle9. The idea was to invent a cosmological
scenario that naturally explained why the universe is fine tuned for complex structures
such as long lived stars, spiral galaxies and organic molecules-using the samemechanism
that biology uses to generate improbable complex structure.
This suggested that there would be in cosmology an analogue of biological fitness-
the number of progeny of a universe as a function of its low energy parameters This
analogy inspired the suggestion that therewould be an evolution of effective field theories
on a landscape of parameters analogous to the fitness landscapes studied by population
biologists10.
This was inspired by an analogy between selection of effective laws in a cosmological
setting and natural selection in a biological setting. The theory is based on two hypothe-
ses:
• Universes reproduce when black hole singularities bounce to become new regions
of spacetime.
• During the bounce, the excursions through a violent interlude at the Planck scale
induces small random changes in the parameters of the effective field theories that
govern physics before and after the transition.
The analogue of biological fitness is then the average number of black holes produced
in a universe, seen as a function of the parameters of the standard models of physics and
9Critiques of cosmological natural selection were published in [29]. These have been all answered in the
recent papers [14, 15] and book [1] (see especially the appendix and end notes.)
10Indeed, the use of the word landscape was meant to suggest the analogy to the fitness landscapes of
evolutionary biology[1].
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cosmology. We can call this function on the landscape the cosmological fitness. Combi-
nations of parameters that are local maxima of this fitness function are attractors on the
landscape. After many generations the population of universes becomes clumped in the
regions near these local maxima.
The great advantage of cosmological natural selection over linear cyclic cosmologies
is then that it creates attractors on the landscape.
This comes about because the effective laws which are most common in the ensemble
of universes are those that reproduce the most, which means they have the most black
holes. Thus, a property P shared by almost all members of the ensemble will be, after
many generations, the following: small changes in the parameters of the effective landscape
will almost always lead to universes which produce fewer black holes. Another way to say this is
the following: If we define the fitness of a point in the landscape by the average number of
black holes produced by a universe with those parameters, then after many generations
almost every member of the ensemble will be near a local maximum of the fitness.
This explains the specialness of the tunings of the parameters of the standard model,
because it turns out that several aspects of those tunings enhance the production of black
holes. These include,
1. The large ratios required for the existence of long lived stable stars, including mproton
mplanck
,
me
mproton
and mν
me
,
2. The coincidences among the proton-neutron mass difference, electron and pionmasses,
making nuclear fusion possible, as well as the sign of the proton-neutron mass dif-
ference.
3. The strength of the weak interaction which appears fine tuned both for nucleosyn-
thesis and for supernovas to inject energy into the interstellar medium, catalyzing
the production of massive stars whose remnants include black holes.
4. The fine tunings which result in the stability and plentiful production of carbon and
oxygen. These appear to be necessary to cool the giant molecular clouds fromwhich
form the massive stars which are the progenitors of black holes as well as to provide
insulation to keep the clouds cold.
It should be emphasized that cosmological natural selection is the only of our scenar-
ios that explains the fine tunings of the parameters of the standard model. It does so
because the cosmological scenario makes low energy physics causative of structure on
a vast scale-that of the population of universes. It does so by strongly influencing the
distribution of parameters in that population.
This feature could be mimicked by the branching cyclic models, but only if there were
some reason why having something like our present low energy physics could lead a
universe to have more regions which were sufficiently homogeneous to bounce. This is
unlikely because the conditions in the final crunch are not going to be sensitive to details
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of the choices of parameters of low energy physics. What cosmological natural selec-
tion accomplishes, apparently uniquely, is to make the population of universes delicately
sensitive to the parameters of low energy physics. It does this naturally and necessarily,
because it takes delicate tunings of parameters to produce a large number of black holes.
Because of this coupling between cosmology and low energy physics, cosmological
natural selection makes a few predictions that are vulnerable to falsification by present
observations. It is instructive to review three of them.
To maximize the number of black holes produced, the upper mass limit (UML) for
stable neutron stars should be as low as possible. As pointed out by Brown and collab-
orators [30], the UML would be lower if neutron stars contain kaon condensates in their
cores. That is,
UMLkaon < UMLconventional (1)
This requires that the kaonmass, and hence the strange quarkmass be sufficiently low.
Since none of the other physics leading to black hole production is sensitive to the strange
quark mass (within the relevant range) cosmological natural selection then implies that
the strange quark mass has been tuned so that neutron stars have kaon condensate cores.
Both the theoretical understanding of the nuclear physics of kaon condenstate stars
and the observational situation has evolved since this predictionwas published in 1992[31].
Bethe and Brown[30] argued that a kaon condenstate neutron star would have an
UMLkaon ≈ 1.6Msolar, so that is the figure I used initially. However, as emphasized re-
cently by Lattimer and Prakash, there is actually a range of predictions for UMLkaon.
These depend on assumptions about the equation of state and range upwards to two
solar masses[31]. So in the light of current knowledge the correct prediction is
UMLkaon < 2Msolar (2)
The present experimental situation is summarized in [31]. There is an observation of a
neutron star with a mass of 1.97 solar masses, to good accuracy. This is just inside the
range consistent with the prediction that neutron stars have lowered upper mass limits
due to having kaon condensate cores. However, there are observations of neutron stars
with wider error bars of around 2.4 solar masses. This, if confirmed, would be inconsis-
tent with the prediction of cosmological natural selection.
So while it is disappointing that the observation of a 1.97 solar mass neutron star can-
not be taken as a falsification of cosmological natural selection, that theory remains highly
vulnerable to falsification in the near future.
One question often raised is why cosmological natural selection is not ruled out by
the possibility of changing a cosmological parameter to greatly increase the production
of primordial black holes. This could be done by turning up the scale of the density
fluctuations, δ = δρ
ρ
which has been measured to be around 10−5.
An answer can be given in the context of single field-single parameter inflation. In
that theory δ is determined by λ the strength of the self-coupling of the inflaton field. This
controls the slope of the inflaton potential and hence the number of efoldings grows with
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decreasing lambda as N ≈ λ−
1
2 . This means that the volume of the universe-and hence
the number of ordinary black holes produced, scales as
V ≈ eN ≈ eδ
−
1
2 (3)
Hence, there is a competition between raising the number of primordial black holes while
exponentially shrinking the universe and so decreasing the number of black holes pro-
duced by stellar evolution. The exponential dominates and the result is that cosmological
natural selection predicts the smallest possible δ consistent with galaxy formation[12, 13].
Onemakesmore black holes overall by having an exponentially bigger universe andmak-
ing them later from stars than one does by having a lot of primordial black holes in a tiny
universe.
However this argument only works in the simplest model of inflation. In more com-
plex models with more fields and parameters, δ is uncoupled to N and one can have
a large universe whose black hole production is dominated by primordial black holes.
Hence, cosmological natural selection predicts that inflation, if true, must be single field
single inflation whose potential is governed by a single parameter. This is so far consis-
tent with all observations, but it could be falsified by future observations, for example if
high levels of non-gaussianity are confirmed.
Once δ is fixed in this way, cosmological natural selection makes a prediction for the
value of the cosmological constant. This is because, if δ is small, as is observed in our
universe, there is a critical value of the cosmological constant, Λ0 such that for Λ > Λ0 the
universe would expand too fast for galaxies to form. But without galaxies there would
not be many massive stars which are the path way to most black holes in our universe.
Hence cosmological natural selection predicts δ small and Λ < Λ0. However the fitness
function will not depend strongly on Λ within that range, hence one can expect11 that in
a typical universe Λ ≈ Λ0.
Note finally that the choice of initial conditions is not so far explained by the scenario
of cosmological natural selection. This is challenging as new universes arise from black
hole singularities which are generically very inhomogeneous. Thus, cosmological nat-
ural selection probably requires inflation to make sense of the specialness of the initial
conditions.
4.3 Pluralistic cosmological scenarios
Let us finally turn to the pluralistic scenarios, of which eternal inflation is the main exam-
ple. In this scenario an infinite population of universes is produced in one step from the
formation of bubbles in an eternally inflating primordial phase. At least in its simplest
form, this lacks the strengths of either the cyclic or the branching scenarios.
11This prediction was pointed to in [1], which was published in 1997, just before the discovery of dark
energy. ”This means that wemay expect that when all the observations have been sorted out, there will be a
small cosmological constant, there will be a neutrino mass and Omega will not be exactly equal to one.”[1],
page 315.
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While a few other bubbles may have collided with our universe-giving a chance to
confirm but not falsify predictions of the scenario[32]-almost all the universes in the pop-
ulation are causally disconnected from our own. It is usually assumed that the universes
that are created randomly sample the points in the landscape of the fundamental the-
ory so there are almost no properties common to all universes. The only property P
put forward as satisfied in all universes is that the curvature should be slightly negative.
However, this will be difficult to confirm or falsify with near future observations because
it will require a great deal of precision to distinguish this from vanishing curvature.
Moreover, the formation of bubbles takes place at very high energies, typically grand
unified scales where the details of the parameters of low energy physics are not going
to matter. So there is no mechanism for a coupling between the fine tunings of low en-
ergy physics and the dynamics that produces the ensemble. in its absence, it has to be
concluded that universes like ours with fine tunings of low energy parameters are very
rare.
In the absence of any large set of properties P , common to the ensemble proponents
of eternal inflation have to fall back on the anthropic principle[33]. This has so far not led
to any genuine predictions, and it is pretty clear why this is unlikely. The properties of a
universe can be divided into two classes. The first class consists of properties that play a
role inmaking a universe friendly to life. Examples include the values of the fine structure
constant and the proton-neutron mass difference. Class two consists of properties that do
not strongly influence the bio-friendlyness of a universe. These include the masses of the
second and third generation fermions (so long as they stay sufficiently heavier than the
first generation.)
The first class of properties must hold and their verification does not provide evidence
for any cosmological scenario-because we already know the universe is bio-friendly. That
is to be explained, by an argument that is not circular, ie does not assume our existence.
The second class are assumed to be randomly distributed in the ensemble-hence, since
they are uncoupled to bio-friendlyness they will be randomly distributed in the ensemble
of bio-friendly universes. Hence no prediction can be made for them.
These kinds of arguments, developed in more detail[1, 34, 14, 15], make it very un-
likely that the anthropic principle can ever be the basis for a prediction by which a cos-
mological scenario could be falsified or strongly verified12.
What are we to make then of the claims that there have been successful predictions
made based on the anthropic principle? In fact, such claims must be fallacious, and they
have been shown to be. This is discussed in detail in [1, 34, 14] but I can mention quickly
here that there are basically two kinds of fallacies in these claims. First, a statement that
X is essential for life is added to an already correct argument involving X.
For example, Hoyle argued successfully that if carbon is produced in stars there must
be a certain energy level in a nuclei. He based this successful argument on the observation
that carbon is abundent in the universe. The fact that carbon plays a role in life plays
12An excellent historical and critical survey of the anthropic principle and related developments is in [38].
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absolutely no role in the argument.
Later Weinberg[35] argued that if there were to be an ensemble of universes with ran-
dom values of the cosmological constant, that Λwould be seen to have a value within an
order or two of magnitude below a critical value, Λ0 above which no galaxies form. This
had nothing to do with life, as galaxies are observed to be plentiful. It is true that the
observed value came to within five percent of the Λ0 Weinberg used.
However, that estimate for Λ0 depended on an assumption about the ensemble of
universes which is that Λ is the only constant to be varied. There is no justification for this
assumption. If other parameters are allowed to vary, the estimate of Λ0 greatly increases,
making the prediction far less successful. For example if Λ and δ are allowed to both vary
the chances are quite small that their values are both as small as observed[36].
The point is not that an ensemble with only Λ varying is more likely than an ensemble
where both Λ and δ vary. The point is that one has to be very cautious about reasoning
from the properties of a posited but unobservable ensemble because one can just make
things up to fit the data. Without any independent check on the properties of the ensem-
ble the fact that one can manipulate the assumptions you make about the ensemble to
make an outcome seem probably does not in any way constitute evidence for the exis-
tence of that ensemble. For example, Garriga and Vilenkin observed[37] that the argu-
ment comes out looking the best if one considers varying a different parameter which is
Λδ3. But this doesn’t add any strength to the claim, both because the value of δ remains
unexplained and because, when a false argument has many possible versions, there will
always be one that fits the data best. The flexibility of tuning a false argument to fit the
data better does not provide evidence its underlying assumptions are true.
We can contrast this with the argument made above in the context of cosmological
natural selection, where there is an independent argument for δ to be small.
Weinberg’s prediction was made a decade before the discovery of dark energy, and in
science this is not nothing; sometimes a strong intuition can produce a correct prediction
even if the logic can be objected to. But this cannot be used as evidence for the assumption
that there really is an ensemble of universes, as the argument from that assumption to the
prediction was fallacious, for the reason just explained. One should also credit Sorkin
for correctly predicting the value of the cosmological constant[39], but for most theorists
this doesn’t strongly increase their confidence in the causal set theory on which Sorkin’s
prediction was based.
These concerns are deepened by the measure problem in eternal inflation. This arises
because there are an infinite number of bubble universes created. When one has infi-
nite ensembles then assertions of predictions based on relative frequencies become highly
problematic. Any claim that outcome A is more probable than outcome B is problematic
when the numbers of A and B are infinite. The ratios of relative frequencies, N(A)/N(B)
are then undefined.
There is a literature whose authors experiment with different measures on these infi-
nite sets which give definitions of the ratios and hence relative frequencies. The challenge
is to avoid various paradoxes, some of which bedevil any application of probability the-
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ory to infinite sets, others of which are special to cosmology. However even if a measure
that succeeds in avoiding all the paradoxes were found that would in no way serve to
increase the likelihood that the eternal inflation scenario is correct, it would just be an-
other instance of making up the specification of an unobservable ensemble in order to get
what one wants from it. The fact that there may be a best version of a false claim does not
increase the credibility of that claim, in the absence of any independent verification of it.
4.4 The case of negative cosmological constant in string theory
A good illustration of these issues is the case of negative cosmological constant in string
theory[40]. There is evidence for a countable infinity of string vacua with negative values
of Λ, accumulating at zero[41]. This is to be contrasted with the claims that there is a
large, but finite number of vacua with small, positive values of Λ[3]. Thus there are so
far known infinitely more string vacua with small negative Λ than with small positive
Λ. This of course would change were infinitely more string vacua found with positive Λ.
Nonetheless it is interesting to examine the consequences, assuming this represents the
real situation.
Let us first consider the consequences for cosmological natural selection. Just as there
is a positive critical value Λ0 which is the upper bound for positive Λ for galaxies to form
(assuming δ is fixed to its current value by its involvement in inflation), there will be a
negative Λ−
0
that any negative value of Λ must exceed if galaxies are to form. Conse-
quently universes will extremize their fitness if Λ is in the range Λ−
0
< Λ < Λ0.
What happens next depends on whether the fitness function depends strongly on the
sign of Λ. Let us first assume it does not. Then, taking into account that there are infinitely
more vacua with Λ−
0
< Λ < 0 than with 0 < Λ < Λ0, a randomly chosen universe will be
infinitely more likely to be in the range Λ−
0
< Λ < 0. Thus, on the assumption the fitness
function does not strongly depend on the sign ofΛ, the conjunction of the string landscape
with cosmological natural selection would predict Λ will be slightly negative[40].
However, the assumption that the fitness function does not depend on the sign of Λ
within the range Λ−
0
< Λ < Λ0 can be questioned
13. The infinite number of string vacua
with Λ < 0 described in [41] are not like small continuations in Λ of the universes with
small positive Λ. They are supersymmetric and the size of the six extra dimensions are
not small, instead they are comparable to the radius of curvature of the four ordinary
dimensions given by R = |Λ|−
1
2 . Being supersymmetric there will not be stable atoms
with complex chemistry because electrons will always convert to their bosonic partners
to reduce the energy of the ground state. And if nine spatial dimensions are large, the
physics is very different. So the fitness function is going to be sensitive to the sign of
Λ. However, the argument need not conclude there, as there may be a subset of these
negative Λ vacua in which supersymmetry is broken spontaneously at lower energies. It
is also possible that there could be brane-worlds related to these solutions on which the
13I am grateful to Ben Freivogel for conversations on this issue.
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usual 3 + 1 dimensional physics lives. All that is needed to restore the argument is that
these occur in a finite fraction of the infinite number of negative Λ vacua.
A similar argument can be run in the case of eternal inflation. Here the argument will
rest on whether the anthropic principle can eliminate the negative Λ solutions as being
unsuited for intelligent life. One can speculate that intelligent life is impossible when
more than three spatial dimensions are large or supersymmetry is unbroken, but it is not
clear how convincing a case can be made for this. In either setting it is far from clear that
we know enough to exclude complex structures leading to life or black hole formation.
5 Conclusions
The claim that string theory provides a framework for the unification of the laws of
physics has long been bedevilled by three issues:
• The lack of a truly background independent formulation,which for reasons argued above
is essential for a quantum theory of gravity. The progress on AdS/CFT is impres-
sive but does not clinch the case, for three reasons. First, it not in a cosmological set-
ting, which requires spatially compact conditions with no boundaries or asymptotic
regions. Second, because the sign of Λ is wrong. Third, there is growing evidence
that the AdS/CFT correspondence is a general feature of gravitational theories and
is not unique to string theory[42]. This is especially evident in the reformulation of
general relativity under the name of shape dynamics[43]. Unfortunately work on
background independent approaches to string or M theory remains inconclusive
and has become largely neglected in recent years.
• The lack of a complete demonstration of perturbative finiteness. My understanding is
that there has been some progress on this issue, but it remains unresolved.
• The landscape problem.
In this essay I have argued that the landscape problem as it arises in string theory is
symptomatic of a much older and deeper issue: that the completion of a scientific under-
standing of our universe requires that we not only know what the laws of nature are, but
explain why these are the laws. Thus, what is at stake is whether Leibniz’s old dream that
we can give a sufficient reason for every physically meaningful property of the universe
can be realized.
I considered here three kinds of cosmological scenarios within which we could search
for a scientific solution to the landscape problem. The results of this analysis were
1. Linear cyclic models could provide a solution to the landscape problem only if
there is an attractor on the landscape corresponding to the standard model and the
changes from generation to generation are sufficiently small that the laws can con-
verge to the attractor. However there appears to be no mechanism for the special
tunings of the standard model to play a role and hence be explained.
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2. Branching cosmological models offer the possibility of explaining more. Branch-
ing cyclic models offer an elegant possibility for explaining the cosmological initial
conditions without inflation, and they could explain the choice of effective theory
under the same conditions as the linear cyclic models. Cosmological natural se-
lection naturally explains the actual fine tunings of the standard model and is the
only scenario to do so. It also is the only scenario to make falsifiable predictions for
present observations.
3. Pluralistic cosmological models such as eternal inflation offer poor prospects for re-
solving the landscape problem. Even if there are attractors in the landscape there
is no reason for the population to converge to them as there is no reason for the
population of universes to be dominated by long chains of descent with incremen-
tal changes generation to generation. Any connection to the real world requires a
strong imposition of the anthropic principle which is very unlikely to yield falsifi-
able predictions.
String theory brought the landscape issue into focus but, as we have seen, it was in-
evitable that as physics progressed we would have encountered the problem of explain-
ing how the universe chose its laws. We can call this the generalized landscape problem.
Whether string theory is the right theory of unification or not, it is clear that this general
landscape problem must be solved. But as we have seen, this problem can only be solved
if we abandon the idea that ultimate explanations in physics are to be given in terms of
laws organized according to the Newtonian paradigm, with timeless laws acting on a
timeless space of states.
Above all this must apply to whatever theory unifies the different effective theories
that make up the landscape. Within string theory the search for this unification has largely
proceeded along traditional lines.
Any solution to the landscape problemmust then transcend the Newtonian paradigm.
As Wheeler, Dirac and Pierce understood, laws must evolve to be explained. It is likely
also that the absolute distinction between laws and states must break down14. Our man-
date is then to invent new kinds of theories that answer these challenges, while staying
true to the demands that theories make predictions by which they can be falsified. The
still open problem of giving string theory or M theory a background independent for-
mulation that would be the setting to resolve the landscape issue should be re-examined
in this light. The main lesson which can be drawn from the successes and failures of at-
tempts to resolve the landscape problem surveyed here is that theories which embrace
the evolution of laws have a better chance to make falsifiable predictions than do theories
which try to hold onto to the notion that law is eternal.
14Amatrix model which serves as an example of a breakdown of the distinction between law and state is
described in [45].
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